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Abstract: In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior
management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—
but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can
derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate
culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish
compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any
doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment.
Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening of the presently
narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such
punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law
theory. The principle obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial
corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and
risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission
liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be
addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition
of individual criminal liability.

INTRODUCTION
Perhaps not since the early twentieth century has there been so much outrage at large
about the malfeasance of the large corporation, and particularly the relationship of senior
managers to such conduct. The sentiment is understandable. In reckoning with the
wrongs of the big business firm in one serious case after another, a responsibility gap has
emerged.1 The financial crisis of 2008 crystallized the problem, which has only repeated
across many scandals since.
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Consider, for example, the case of General Motors, in which over one hundred people
have died in road accidents caused or aggravated by a faultily designed starter switch,
and in which GM’s managers can be said to have run a dysfunctional organization but not
to have had knowledge of or involvement in the operative engineering decisions.2 Or
British Petroleum’s Deep Horizon well, where eleven workers died in a preventable
explosion that spilled five million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, and in which
BP’s managers ran an aggressive deep-sea drilling program but had no knowledge of or
involvement in the decisions on the well that led to its cataclysmic failure.3
More recently, the huge banking firm Wells Fargo became an emblem of the seeming
impossibility of controlling management of big financial services corporations.4 The
bank fired over 5000 employees for a widespread but simple form of fraud designed to
boost sales and therefore bonuses: signing customers up for accounts they had not
requested. The CEO, John Stumpf, forfeited millions in compensation and resigned, after
enduring the usual severe congressional chastisement. But aside from approving the
bank’s management structure and compensation systems, he appears, at most, to have
been the recipient of a couple of warnings that there might be a problem, perhaps buried
in a mountain of information coming through his office. In any event, Stumpf cannot be
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shown to have directed fraud, just as in the mortgage-backed securities fiasco leading up
to 2008 top managers of the mega-banks appear to have floated well above the details of
how their derivatives traders executed any individual deals that might have crossed the
line from ill-advised for the buyers to intentionally deceptive.5
There are many more such contemporary cases, of course.

They are to be

distinguished from those in which firms are smaller and top managers have their hands on
operational details: Stewart Parnell, the CEO of the peanut company whose products
killed people after he directed “ship it” in spite of lack of required safety testing;6 or
Donald Blankenship, the CEO of the coal company Massey Energy, whose obsessive
efforts to limit the costs of the federal government’s mine safety rules led to the
explosion of the Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia, killing nearly thirty workers.7
(Both men stand convicted, though neither of homicide.)
The case of concern here is the one of what we can call a responsibility gap—one in
which conventional theories of criminal liability do not easily, or even under strain,
satisfy understandable deterrent and retributive urges directed at corporate managers.
The problem in such cases arises structurally from, and is unique to, the large
corporate institution. To ascribe criminal liability only at the “line” level of the workers
on the ground—the GM switch engineer, the BP rig workers, the Wells Fargo branch
officials—is not just to come up short in ascribing responsibility to all those who bear it.
The problem goes beyond that.
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There is a sense in the corporate context that if
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management created a corporate culture and a system of incentives that made the relevant
conduct and ensuing harm likely or even inevitable, then the line workers—at least
morally though not legally—have a kind of partial excuse. This is what is meant when
people, including those who have sat on juries in several high-profile cases, say that the
prosecution treated the low or mid-level worker as a “scapegoat.”8 It is not just that
management is also responsible. It is that management appears to be more responsible.
Of course, the other fact generating the responsibility gap is that management is not
present in such prosecutions for good reason: settled criminal law does not contain tools
to punish this sort of thing. Managers in this type of case have mostly omitted to prevent
another person’s crime.

And they have generally omitted to do so while lacking

knowledge that wrongdoing was afoot. Neither act nor mental state, the loci to which
criminal liability attaches, is present, at least not in most recognizable form.
In the context of criminal organizations, doctrines of conspiracy and accomplice
liability, as well as specialized statutes such as RICO that address group criminality, deal
effectively (some would say too effectively) with the role of the hands-off manager. But
those tools work in that context only because of its factual texture:

the thorough

criminality of the organization’s business plan makes it vastly easier to infer the mental
state of managers with respect to the crimes of their underlings. Not so with the large
legitimate business firm, in which the serious criminal episode, however disastrous, is an
aberration in a project that overwhelmingly involves legal, indeed often intensely desired,
behaviors. Former BP CEO Tony Hayward, in other words, was no Tony Soprano.
8
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The responsibility gap has long exerted pressure on the criminal law in corporate
cases. The problem may be acute at present but it is not new. A twentieth century
appreciation for harms associated with corporate production of goods, especially
substances that enter bodies, long ago produced the peculiar doctrine of “responsible
corporate officer” liability.9 RCO, as I will call it, provides that in certain federal
regulatory regimes—most prominently, the food and drug laws and the clean air and
water laws—a corporate manager can be held criminally liable, at the misdemeanor level,
if he stood in “responsible relation” to a violation of the law anywhere within the
corporation, even if he did not act or advert with respect to the violation.10
RCO is not a solution to the responsibility gap.

Even in current form it is

objectionable, if perhaps bearable. But to make it a real solution for cases such as those
we have discussed, legislators and judges would have to expand the doctrine into many
other areas of federal regulation and criminal law. As crimes became more serious
(felonies) and more intent-based (fraud, for example—the most commonly relevant crime
in the financial sector), RCO would become more than a slightly embarrassing but
circumscribed and perhaps tolerable exception to principles of individual fault. It would
require a sea change in Anglo-American theories of punishment. Justification for such
change, as we will see, is exceedingly hard to construct.
Corporate criminal liability is another mechanism by which American law attempts to
close the responsibility gap. As I have argued elsewhere, in partial opposition to the
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standard law and economics account, the doctrine can perform a blaming function that
has utility.11 It does not imprison, of course. But it does more than impose monetary
sanctions under a criminal label. Criminalizing a corporation for a serious offense that is
the product of the firm’s structure and culture—that is, of its management situation—can
send a powerful message to those who operate that firm, as well as similarly situated
firms, about what sort of behaviors in the corporate context are condemnable. When fault
is generalized from the individual to the firm, managers are, at least in part, objects of
meaningful blame. We know this not only because it makes sense but also because large
firm managers perpetually express intense fears and complaints about the Department of
Justice and its corporate criminal liability cudgel.
The function of corporate criminal liability in narrowing the responsibility gap is
underappreciated. Nonetheless, the doctrine cannot close the gap. Its limitations and
flaws have been well documented.12 Among them is the obvious point that a criminal
conviction of a corporation simply does not authorize or involve individual punishment
of managers. Any influence they experience from a corporate conviction is indirect and
refracted.

In many cases, contrary and pernicious influences on managers may

overwhelm effects of the legal doctrine, as for example in a “last period” when managers
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conclude that failure of the firm, or at least of their tenures, is the only alternative to
overly aggressive or even criminal decisions.13
And in the cases in which the responsibility gap is of greatest public concern—the
GMs, BPs, and Wells Fargos—actual imposition of corporate criminal liability may be
off the table. To convict such a firm, especially of a serious felony carrying de-licensing
and debarment implications, is often to put that firm out of business. That is, the death
penalty may be the only available punishment.

Because the economic and social

structure of the United States depends so heavily on the existence and survival of such
firms, prosecutors understand that full prosecution is not a realistic option. Thus we have
the now institutionalized practice of settling corporate criminal cases with deferred and
nonprosecution agreements.14

These deals can impose discomfort on managers,

particularly if they include provisions requiring reform of corporate functions.
Sometimes such agreements are even accompanied by removal and replacement of
managers.

But the parade of corporate disasters that continue to unfold in an era

dominated by these settlements—and the only growing public outrage about such
disasters—suggests that DOJ’s settlements, however punitive, fall short of closing the
responsibility gap.
The dominance of the corporate criminal settlement brings us to the nub of the
problem.

The responsibility gap is symptomatic of deep unease with the large

corporation itself: the too-big-to-manage problem; the mismatch between the scale and
13
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power of the institution and human capacity to control it; the American dependence on
these economic powerhouses and our resentment of their tendency to do us wrong.
Making it easier to use criminal law to punish corporate managers for wrongdoing
within corporations might yield some additional deterrence, and perhaps some public
satisfaction. But only at the cost of badly compromising principles of punishment, not to
mention the potential for costly excessive deterrence. More to the point, the impulse to
expand criminal liability for managers is not going to get us what we seem so badly to
want:

a humanizing of the corporation—a compression of this unwieldy legal and

economic institution down to a size or into a form that appears amenable to control and
punishment. For that, we would need to look outside the criminal law to the law and
institutions that created the modern corporation in the first instance and that bear primary
responsibility for its constitution and regulation.
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Part I documents and explains the
responsibility gap. Part II shows why RCO, even in imagined new forms, cannot close
the gap. Part III shows why corporate criminal liability also cannot close the gap. Part
IV concludes by considering how we might think about the problem of corporate
criminality outside of, and prior to, the criminal law—indeed, how we might think about
it more ambitiously than the persistent impulse to imprison corporate managers has
conceived of the problem.
I. THE RESPONSIBILITY GAP
To see the problem of the responsibility gap in corporate crime, let us consider three
hypothetical cases. All three involve CEOs who bear some form of responsibility for
serious cataclysms. Their jobs include many duties, but perhaps paramount among them

9
are duties to ensure that the relevant events do not transpire on their watches. All three
have the capacity to prevent what happens.
We can be sure that the three receive ample financial rewards for doing the CEO job,
in all likelihood higher rewards than any others associated with their companies. That
compensation, together with the CEO title, reflects in part the burden that is placed on
them to worry about and prevent the most damaging things that can happen to firms in
their particular industries.

Beyond that, at least according to some intuitions, their

lucrative pay differentiates them from most in society in terms of the quality of behavior
others are entitled to expect of them. In other words, much is expected from those to
whom much is given.
This account of CEO responsibility, which is only sketched here, is an account of
serious moral fault. Especially if one believes harm is relevant to fault, the account
involves the kind of reasoning that justifies consequences to a wrongdoer that are more
than financial. Traditional principles of criminal law, however, do not permit the first
two of our three CEOs to be held liable. They permit liability for the third only on an
expansive account of punishment for negligence.

All three cases present serious

problems on the dimensions of both act and mental state.
Case 1: Albert is the CEO of a company that manufactures an industrial gas in a
process including highly volatile chemicals, one of which is compound X. Albert thinks
to himself one morning, “I know I’m supposed to go to work because I’m in charge of an
important company but I’d rather play golf and drink scotch today, and perhaps tomorrow
as well.” As he does with some frequency, Albert eschews the office that day and goes to
his country club where he plays eighteen holes and then has scotches with his
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buddies. Meanwhile, the company’s plant blows up, killing all of Albert’s employees
who are inside. The cause is aging equipment used to handle compound X.
Albert has omitted to do anything. Indeed, that is precisely the problem in his case.
He simply did not do his job, either generally with respect to ensuring adequate safety at
his chemical plant or specifically with respect to showing up at work on the day in
question. Anglo-American criminal law, for reasons usually viewed as compelling, has
long rejected a blanket rule making omissions to act an allowable basis for violating
criminal statutes.15 Omission liability is not entirely ruled out but is permitted only if a
criminal statute is expressly constructed around a failure to act (not filing a tax return, for
example) or if law otherwise imposes a duty to act (that of a parent to provide medical
aid to a sick child, for example).
Of course, the limiting principles for omission liability only push the question back
one level: When is a legislature justified in prohibiting a failure to act and what duties
among the countless duties in law justify imposing punishment for failure to act? In
Albert’s case, we can postpone discussion of the former question for the moment—
because RCO is a highly germane example of a legislatively imposed requirement to act.
As for legal duties, Albert has no currently recognized duty in criminal law to act to
prevent the explosion at his plant. There is no CEO-employee or CEO-investor duty akin
to that of parent to child, spouse to spouse, or doctor to patient. Even more implausible
as a footing for criminal omission liability would be a duty running from the CEO to the
public at large.

15
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Albert has a well-recognized (though still somewhat controversial) duty in corporate
law to exercise reasonable diligence in preventing criminal violations within his firm.16
But this is a civil duty that, due to common indemnification rules,17 carries limited
personal consequences to Albert in the event he violates it. An argument to transform
that general duty of corporate officers and directors to monitor the firm for criminal
violations into a rule of omission liability for any crime not prevented would be, to say
the least, hard to construct.18 Virtually all theorists agree that omission liability, if
justified, needs careful circumscription—for both retributive and utilitarian reasons.19 If
Albert’s duty of care in monitoring for crime could qualify as the sort of “duty imposed
by law” that criminal omission liability takes as its foundation, then so too might many
tort duties of care such as the duties of innkeepers, tour guides, universities, and so on.20
On the dimension of act, then, the core of the task in closing the responsibility gap is to
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specify and cabin the managerial duty that could give rise to any theory of omission
liability.
Albert’s mens rea is also a legal problem. He certainly had no knowledge or intent
with respect to his facility exploding. The tragedy was perhaps the last thing Albert
wanted to see happen at his company. If, as his lassitude suggests, Albert was unaware
of the existence of the faulty equipment at the facility, he also was not reckless because
he did not consciously disregard the relevant risk.
Albert, then, was at most negligent in choosing to play golf and drink scotch rather
than attend to his work. Any theory of negligence liability, however, must specify the
relevant risk. It is not sufficient for criminal negligence to find that Albert, in playing
hooky from work, failed to think about riskiness in the world or even riskiness in the
entirety of his company’s business—risk in the air, so to speak. One cannot be liable for
being a negligent person; one must be found to have been negligent with respect to
something, namely a specifiable risk.21
To hold Albert criminally liable in connection with the explosion of dangerous
compound X, we must conclude: that Albert failed to advert to that risk; that the risk was
both substantial (more facts needed perhaps) and unjustifiable (likely the case, though at
least in part a question of cost-benefit analysis); and that Albert’s failure to advert was a
gross deviation from the conduct of the reasonable CEO. In other words, we must
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conclude not only that Albert should have gone to work more often but that, while there,
he should have attended more to the matter of the equipment used to handle compound X.
This will depend on knowing more about the structure of Albert’s company, industry
standards, the presence of any warning signs of risk that Albert failed to notice, and so
on. Suppose, for example, that Albert—in part to relax himself on the golf course—had
recently hired a safety expert with a sterling reputation in the industry and told him, “Do
your job, I don’t need to know about anything you do unless it’s a major cost item.”
Albert might bear serious responsibility for the deaths—for example, because he could
have done much more to monitor the expert’s work—yet not fit even criminal negligence
doctrine.
Then there is the additional problem of justifying punishment for negligence. Even if
the risk of the explosion was substantial and unjustifiable, and Albert’s failure to be
aware of it was a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable CEO, does Albert
deserve to go to prison for the deaths of the employees? Many members of the public
undoubtedly will think so. But their intuitions will be driven in large part by the harm
associated with Albert’s negligence, a matter of what some would argue is largely
irrelevant moral luck.22
One analytical view—perhaps reflected in the positive criminal law of most
jurisdictions in the United States—would be that any punishment for negligence must be
proportionately mild and that the moral luck factor cannot bootstrap a case of relatively
minor culpability into a major one.23 Other theorists of the criminal law would insist that
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a failure to advert to risk such as Albert’s can never justify criminal condemnation
because the absence of any choice on Albert’s part means he has committed no moral
fault.24
Case 2: Brad is the CEO of a very large global banking firm. His firm uses a bonus
system to generously compensate traders who maintain profitable books.

In the

occasional year when the firm’s profits are down, layoffs of traders are common. Lack of
profitability in a trader’s books is the primary basis the bank uses for selecting whom to
layoff in such circumstances. A group of five traders in the bank’s Frankfurt office who
trade derivatives in currency markets make a bad bet, going long on a particular group of
currencies that plummet due to a sharp unanticipated increase in oil prices. The traders
hide the increasing hole in their positions by deliberately mismarking their books for six
months. When their losses reach $1 billion, the truth emerges and Brad’s bank is forced
to announce a huge loss in earnings. Overall economic conditions are very poor and
nervous creditors lose confidence in the bank, calling in loans and refusing to do new
deals. Within two months, Brad’s firm is bankrupt. Many investors and employees are
wiped out.
The responsibility gap is perhaps more evident in Brad’s case than in Albert’s. No
one died in Brad’s case but many more people were harmed, some very painfully. More

September 2006 in West Warwick, Rhode Island killed 100 and injured many more. The fire was caused
by careless handling of a musical act’s pyrotechnic show, coupled with installation of flammable insulation
in the club. A co-owner of the club pled no contest to 100 counts of involuntary manslaughter and was
released on parole after serving three years in prison. Eric Tucker, Co-Owner of R.I. Club Where 100 Died
to be Released Early, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2008; see also Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383
(1944) (owner of Cocoanut Grove night club held liable for homicide for deaths of hundreds of patrons
who perished in a fire in a facility without adequate fire escapes).
24
E.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note ___, at 70-85; for contrary views on the basic moral question,
see, e.g., Seana Shiffrin, The Moral Neglect of Negligence in 3 OXFORD STUDIES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne & S. Wall eds. forthcoming 2017); Gideon Yaffe, Intoxication, Recklessness, and
Negligence, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 545 (2012).
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importantly, Brad actually did something. Brad implemented a compensation system
that, as we know only too well after the last decade or more of banking scandals, was a
powerful fuel for a crime committed by others under Brad’s supervision. Brad also
relevantly failed to act: by not monitoring the books of his traders sufficiently to detect
and prevent emerging fraud.
But Brad’s actions in designing a compensation system are not relevant actions to the
crime of fraud, the gravamen of which is deceit. Brad was in no way involved in the
decisions to mismark the Frankfurt books and thus cannot be said to have engaged in the
actus reus of fraud, or to have conspired to do so or aided and abetted such action. As a
basis for satisfying the act requirement, Brad’s omission to monitor the books presents
the same problems of duty as did Albert’s omission to monitor plant safety.
Even though Brad appears to have thought a bit more about his traders than Albert
thought about his safety processes, Brad’s mens rea is even more of an obstacle than
Albert’s to constructing a theory of criminal liability.

While in Albert’s case it is

conceivable that the relevant crime (homicide, most likely) could be committed
negligently, in Brad’s case the relevant crime is fraud. The mens rea for fraud is the
specific intent to defraud the victim.25 Fraud, which in the criminal context is constituted
by purposeful deception, cannot be committed negligently. I have argued that criminal
fraud cannot be committed recklessly either.26 There is no such thing as “oops I
defrauded you” or even “maybe this will defraud you but I’m going to do it anyway.”

25
26

Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511 (2011).
Id. at 555-61.
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The relevant statutes require a “scheme to defraud,” which necessarily involves
planning.27
The mens rea problem in Brad’s case will be common to many, though certainly not
all, cases of corporate crime. White collar crimes such as fraud, obstruction of justice,
and bribery often require high levels of mens rea for liability—typically knowledge of
certain facts plus specific forms of intent, such as the purpose to defraud, to obstruct legal
process, or to influence official action. (“Regulatory offenses” that involve strict liability
will be discussed shortly.)

In many cases, corporate managers can create fertile

conditions for those under their supervision to commit such crimes without intending that
crimes be committed. Indeed, though he exerted little effort to make it happen, Brad
would no doubt have preferred that his traders return healthy profits and earn lavish
bonuses while remaining assiduously within the confines of the law.
Case 3: Clara is the martinet CEO of an automobile company. Determined to
succeed in the intensely competitive, low margin market for small sedans, Clara orders
her team to design a new car following a “rule of fifteen”: under no circumstances
should the car cost more than $15,000 or weigh more than 1500 pounds.28 Clara then
turns her relentless focus to the company’s core and most profitable line of business,
trucks and SUVs. The team, which does not brief Clara on any details during the
development process, delivers a car on time that complies with Clara’s rule of fifteen—
but only by including a cheap, vulnerable fuel tank that explodes easily on rear impact.
After the car reaches market, collisions involving tank explosions kill five hundred
people.
27

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; 17 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
Cf. Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 1, 1977; Malcolm Gladwell, The Engineer's
Lament, THE NEW YORKER, May 4, 2015.
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Loosely speaking, with respect to the wrongdoing and harm, Clara does more and has
“more” mens rea than either Albert or Brad. Still, justifying criminal punishment of
Clara is problematic—including in ways not as evident in the cases of Albert and Brad.
On the negative side of Clara’s ledger, many people are dead as a result of her express
directive to her employees, which determined not the specifications but the nature of the
car they would build. It is possible to say that Clara did more than omit to prevent the
faulty conduct in this case (engineering of the fuel tank). On the dimension of action,
Clara’s case begins to approach, though not reach, those of the micromanaging CEOs of
smaller companies who were convicted for their direct involvement in the shipments of
tainted peanuts or the explosion of the coalmine.
It is on mens rea that Clara’s case more pointedly raises the problem of the
responsibility gap. Her rule of fifteen, elevating form over substance, followed by her
lack of interest in knowing how the rule was satisfied—and her management style
discouraging reporting of bad news—appear to make her more blameworthy than Brad,
who simply paid salespeople on commission, and certainly more blameworthy than
Albert who just ignored what the relevant employees were doing. Among the three cases,
Clara’s most displays what Ken Simons calls culpable indifference to risk—a callousness
or

morally

obtuse

attitude

toward

consequences

that

arguably

aggravates

blameworthiness beyond the minimum culpability required for recklessness or
negligence.29
Clara, of course, did not act with knowledge or intent with regard to the collision
deaths. Indeed, and not to her credit, Clara’s management approach virtually guaranteed
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Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992).
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that she would be unaware of sufficient facts about the automobile to satisfy these
demanding mental states. As to recklessness or negligence—whether Clara considered
and disregarded death risk or failed to advert to it when she should have—her case is
stronger than Albert’s and Brad’s with respect to specificity of risk. In Albert’s case, one
had to equate his failure to attend to his entire job with failure to attend to (or his
disregard of) the risk of plant explosion. In Brad’s case, one had to equate his failure to
attend to (or his disregard of) the risk of bonuses incentivizing misconduct with failure to
attend to the risk that bonuses would stimulate fraud in the Frankfurt books. And, even
then, negligence does not, as we saw, work as a mens rea for fraud. Clara, however,
specified limits on the construction of the sedan that necessarily involved risks of fatal
accidents due to cheap construction of the car, at least at that level of specificity.
But this brings us to the additional problem with Clara as a case of recklessness or
negligence.

For either mental state, the risk must have been both substantial and

unjustifiable. Cars crash and crashes kill people. This is, at least for now, a fact of the
automobile business. Given the size of Clara’s industry, even substantial numbers of
crashes are justifiable—or we would not build cars and drive them. Clara is also allowed
to offer a cheap car on the market. The question of the point at which Clara’s “rule”
becomes one of unjustifiable risk is a complicated matter of cost-benefit analysis,
industry standards, and regulatory frameworks.30 (I am assuming, of course, that the fuel
tank on the car did not violate any then-existing laws.) Is a rule of fifteen not justifiable
but a rule of twenty acceptable? Or is twelve the number below which Clara could not go
without becoming a criminal?

30

Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1, 62-66 (2012).
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Criminal negligence relatedly requires that the failure to advert to risk constitute a
major departure (a “gross deviation”) from the conduct of the reasonable person in the
actor’s situation. The justifiability of the risk and the reasonableness of failing to attend
to it are related and overlapping matters. On both scores, the norms of Clara’s industry
and the complex questions of cost-benefit analysis that govern (or ought to govern) it will
have much to say about how to judge her case. This is so with respect to reasonableness
not only because reasonableness is generally about norms but also because the
reasonableness inquiry in criminal negligence depends in large part on how subjective to
make the inquiry, that is, on how much of the actor’s individual “situation” to take into
account in determining what was reasonable.31
The problem of uncertainty about the justification line (as well as about
reasonableness) is of course general to reliance on criminal negligence liability, and a
reason some would reject negligence in the criminal law altogether. But the problem is
particularly acute in the context of corporate crime, and especially in managerial liability
for corporate crime, because lawful industries almost always involve justifiable levels of
risk and managers have the central job of determining how much of what kinds of risks to
take. When things turn out badly—when explosions kill people, for example—it may
appear obvious that too much risk was taken when in fact the question, considered ex
ante, is much less clear.32
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See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note ___, at 81-85. Even the thoughtful drafters of the Model Penal
Code recognized this question to be essentially insoluble through rules, preferring to leave the matter of
how far to subjectivize reasonableness to the discretion of the jury. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note ___ § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) (the phrase "from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation" in the
statute governing reasonableness for purposes of reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter is "designedly
ambiguous" and has to do whether the facts "arouse sympathy in the ordinary citizen").
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See Simons, supra note ___ [statistical].
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There are thus two prominent features of the corporate institution that give rise to the
problem of the responsibility gap. First, the size and complexity of the large firm
mandate division of labor and delegation. Indeed, those are express objectives of the
legal and economic concept of the firm, pursued in the name of efficiency. As tasks
divide and flow down a corporation’s various ladders and ultimately lead to regrettable
events, it becomes difficult to assign to those at the top, who initiate the flow of tasks, the
sort of legal responsibility with which criminal law is comfortable.
Second, while the matter varies a great deal by industry, risk-taking in the corporate
context is, generally speaking, beneficial and encouraged. It is thus much more difficult
than in many other contexts for criminal law to specify—and thus to provide reasonable
notice of—the degree and types of risk-taking that are clearly enough out of bounds to
warrant punishment.33
II. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
A.

Existing Doctrine
RCO is actual law that seeks to close the responsibility gap—as well as being good

evidence that the gap is a real problem, since the doctrine has persisted for decades and is
embodied in some federal statutes.34 As explained by the Supreme Court in the pivotal
Park case, liability extends under RCO to “all who had a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.” Park was the CEO of a large
33

Several helpful commenters on drafts of this and related papers have pointed out that these are really
“large organization” problems, not strictly corporate problems. This is true. But I focus here on the legal
firm (not just public corporations but also nonprofits, partnerships, and so on) because that is the institution
that has generated the great majority of calls for legal action when things have gone wrong. The military is
another large institution in which problems of managerial responsibility arise with some frequency. The
normative structure there is sufficiently different from the corporate context that I believe it requires
separate treatment. See Jenny Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUSTICE 638 (2007).
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United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); see also
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6).
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food company with many facilities including a warehouse in which regulators discovered
rodent infestation. It was sufficient for conviction, the Court said, “[that] by virtue of the
relationship [Park] bore to the corporation, [he] had the power to prevent the act
complained of.”35
The Court admitted and accepted that liability in the case was imposed without regard
to culpability and on the basis of mere omission to act. (The rule, the Court said,
dispenses with any requirement of “consciousness of wrongdoing.”36) The government,
it said, makes out its case if it “introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the
trier of facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation,
responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct,
the violation complained of, and he failed to do so.” 37
RCO is fiat. The doctrine sweeps away the problems of action and mental state by
dispensing with inquiry into either. The Park Court was explicit in its intention to craft a
doctrine—or find that Congress had crafted one—designed to close the responsibility
gap: “The requirements of vigilance and foresight imposed on responsible corporate
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more
stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions
of authority in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and
well-being of the public that supports them.”38
While existing RCO takes away with one hand, it gives back with another that
perhaps makes the fiat of RCO tolerable. The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act,
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Park, 421 U.S. at 671.
Park, 421 U.S. at 670.
37
Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
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from which the doctrine sprung when the Court interpreted the statute to encompass RCO
in United States v. Dotterweich,39 imposes strict liability at the misdemeanor level only.
The same is true of two other federal statutory regimes in which strict liability RCO is
expressly adopted:

the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.40 Park, the food

company CEO, took his case all the way to the Supreme Court after suffering a
punishment of a $250 total fine for five counts of conviction. Even still, the Court was
careful to allow that RCO permits an excusing defensive claim that the officer was
“powerless” to prevent or remedy the relevant violation of law.41
The misdemeanor limitation on RCO is no happenstance. It is traceable to RCO’s
origins in a group of common law decisions involving criminal misdemeanor liability for
matters that look, through a modern lens, quasi-criminal at most. For example, an
eighteenth and nineteenth century practice was to grant utility-like rights to companies to
build specific turnpikes and railroads by statute, which statutes included misdemeanor
penalties—imposed through criminal prosecution—for failure to construct or maintain
the thoroughfare as specified. These penalties (fines) could be imposed on the managers
and directors of the corporation governed by the statute, sometimes regardless of proof of
knowledge of the relevant failure.42 A related line of decisions had to do with
39

320 U.S. 277 (1943).
Responsible corporate officer liability for antitrust violations has also been found to apply under the
Sherman Act. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
41
Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
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E.g., Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 203 (Ct. Correction of Errors N.Y. 1831) (holding a director of a road and
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authority to build the road, and affirming a penalty of a $200 fine); Rex v. Medley, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246
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corporations. See King v. Hollond, 101 Eng. Rep. 340 (1794) (approving prosecution of an official of the
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misdemeanor criminal liability for breach of responsibilities to keep the peace or enforce
the law by public office holders, used as a vehicle for removing a defendant from office.43
These predecessor decisions, while involving actions of prosecutors, have a closer
analogue in civil actions of the modern regulatory state, such as Securities and Exchange
Commission enforcement proceedings, than in present-day criminal prosecutions.44 The
Dotterweich Court, in accepting a theory of guilt in the absence of mens rea, relied
heavily on a body of decisional material that was explicitly regulatory in its orientation
and that did not involve serious criminal punishments.45 When the Court, in a crucial but
conclusory passage, invoked “the historical conception [that] a ‘misdemeanor’ makes all
those responsible for it equally guilty,” it oddly cited to an 1833 Supreme Court case
standing for the procedural proposition that at common law there could be no
accomplices to misdemeanors, only principals.46 Perhaps tellingly, the Court then refused
to define what it meant by “the class of employees” who are liable because they “stand in
responsible relation” to the offense, saying the matter would be “too treacherous to define

East India Company for failing to pursue military action in the Indian state of Madras, as required by a
statute granting the corporation its colonial authority) (cited in Kane).
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E.g., Coffey v. Superior Ct., 147 Cal. 525 (1905); Hopewell v. State, 22 Ind. App. 489 (1899); State v.
Gluck, 49 Kan. 533 (1892); People v. Meakim, 133 N.Y. 214 (1892); People v. Herlihy, 73 N.Y.S. 236
(A.D. 1st Dept. 1901); see also Criminal Law: Liability of Public Officers for Neglect of Duty, 4 U. FLA. L.
REV. 264 (1951).
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or even to indicate by way of illustration” and must be left to juries.47 Thus RCO’s
murky provenance lies nearly outside the criminal law and cannot be cited as authority
for the novel concept of punishing corporate management failures with imprisonment.
Some have attempted to read Park and the RCO court decisions more narrowly,
arguing that Park implied that CEO negligence is required for the imposition of RCO
liability.48 This is not persuasive. The argument rests largely on a fact in Park that the
Court did not dwell on or analyze: that, some time before the warehouse inspection in
question, Park had received a letter from the FDA notifying him of rodent infestation in a
facility in another city and that, in response, he had merely directed his employees to
address the matter. The Court’s language about lack of mens rea and omission liability is
clear.

The Court did not engage in any negligence-like analysis by, for example,

addressing the level of risk involved or Park’s particular thinking, or lack thereof, with
regard to the risk.
Current RCO, then, is harsh but also narrow and lenient. It is not a general doctrine
of liability, like conspiracy or accomplice liability. It must be initiated by Congress and
arise in the courts through statutory interpretation. The specialized field of antitrust law
aside, only three federal statutory schemes contain RCO, all of which deal with safety
regulation of substances that all Americans put into their bodies. No statute or court has
embraced RCO for felony liability and there is an excusing defense built into RCO to
alleviate its strict liability harshness.
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Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
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We could, therefore, deal with RCO as a question of whether this modest compromise
with principles of retributive desert is justified on utilitarian grounds—specifically those
grounds of protecting public health and safety in the corporate context that the Supreme
Court has named as motivating RCO. (I take as given that criminal liability in the
absence of both act and culpable mental state poses serious retributive problems, at least
as a facial matter; after all, the Supreme Court has ruled at least one such law
unconstitutional.49)
The germane question with respect to the responsibility gap, however, is whether
RCO could be justified in broader form, on the dimension of crimes or punishment
severity. The desire to see managers punished in cases like Albert’s, Brad’s, and Clara’s
extends the question of RCO well beyond food, air, and water law and far above
misdemeanor fines of a few hundred dollars. Perhaps the most salient question of today
in the field of corporate crime is whether, for example, a bank manager could be held
liable for fraud, or a similarly serious offense, for failing to prevent his traders from
breaking the law. Indeed the Justice Department, without admitting that it well knows
the legal obstacles it faces, recently issued forceful guidance to its prosecutors (the
“Yates Memo”) requiring them to focus more intensely on pursuing individual
prosecutions in investigations of corporate wrongdoing—guidance plainly issued
defensively after years of criticism for insufficient zeal in prosecuting corporate
managers.50
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B. Expanding the Doctrine?
We can move quickly to the heart of the matter by dispensing with the idea that this
sort of liability could be justified in the absence of any culpability inquiry at all. Serious
constitutional questions aside, lengthy imprisonment (perhaps any imprisonment) for
failing to prevent another from committing a crime in spite of exercising due care could
only be justified by the kind of “even punishing the innocent deters crime” utilitarian
reasoning that does not fare well under cost-benefit analysis. Further, that reasoning fails
utterly in a system of justification based in part, as ours is, on some version of negative
retributivism—roughly, the belief that some requirement of blameworthiness as a
condition of punishment at least presumptively constrains the state’s power to punish in
the cause of crime prevention.
The central question is thus how a modified version of RCO requiring recklessness or
negligence with respect to the legal violation in question would fare under justification
analysis. Consider, for example, what the United Kingdom has recently done. A new
statute punishes by up to seven years in prison what one might call reckless bankruptcy
of a bank.51 The offense elements are: (1) that the defendant was a “senior manager” of a
“financial institution” (defined terms), (2) that the defendant participated in a decision or
failed to take steps to prevent a decision, (3) which decision caused the failure of the
financial institution, (4) the defendant was aware at the time of the decision that
implementing the decision risked the failure of the institution, and (5) the defendant’s
“conduct in relation to the taking of the decision [fell] far below what could reasonably
be expected of a person in [the defendant’s] position.”

51

UNITED KINGDOM FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 2013 § 36.

27
This is not quite RCO because it does not hold the manager liable for someone else’s
offense. It criminalizes the “act” of managing a bank into bankruptcy, specifically an
outcome-determinative decision (or failure to stop such a decision) with respect to
insolvency. But the statute begins to look a bit like RCO in its idea of a crime of, so to
speak, recklessness at the helm.
Even still, the statute is arguably symbolic. The term “financial institution” is defined
to include only large and systemically important firms. It will be quite rare for such a
firm to land in bankruptcy, rarer still that a specific management decision will be
identifiable as having caused that bankruptcy, and even rarer that a prosecutor will pursue
such a case and that a jury will arrive at a decision to convict because the conduct fell
“far below what could reasonably be expected.” It is doubtful that any UK court will
ever send a manager to prison under the authority of this law.
But the statute is informative if taken a bit more seriously. It imposes a kind of
recklessness standard: the manager must have considered the risk of failure and his
decision to go forward in the face of the risk must have fallen “far below” (i.e., grossly
deviated) from the conduct of a reasonable manager in the situation. Both of these
elements of the statute’s fault standard are confusing. On the first element, when does a
manager of a financial firm know that his decisions risk insolvency? Arguably all the
time, since some measure of managing a bank profitably and competitively in today’s
financial markets necessarily requires taking on a degree of leverage that implicates a
myriad of risks, not least the risks—the known unknowns—associated with potential
global or commodity-specific financial crises. Without more detail, it cannot be said in
any coherent way that it is blameworthy for a bank manager to risk insolvency.
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A similar problem affects the “far below” element of the statute’s fault standard. If
chiefs of financial services firms necessarily must run insolvency risks then how much
risk is too much to have been reasonable? That will be for a jury to decide, presumably
on the basis—one might hope—of a tutorial from dueling experts about how banks are
operated.

It is hard to imagine how such a tutorial could produce, except in an

extravagant case of total mismanagement, the kind of clarity one would want for a
criminal conviction.
Consider, for example, the case of JP Morgan’s derivatives traders in London, one of
whom became known as the infamous “London Whale.”52 Robustly incentivized by a
bonus compensation system and determined to solve their own problem in order to avoid
management approbation, these traders dug a deeper and deeper hole in their books while
concealing the problem by mismarking their positions. The hole reached $1 billion
before the facts came out and Morgan had to admit that it had seriously defrauded its own
shareholders.
Suppose that admission, contrary to the actual case, had cratered the entire bank and
that something like the UK statute applied. Would the top manager of JP Morgan belong
in prison because he used financial incentives to encourage his derivatives traders to take
risk? Of course not. The banking industry has run on bonusing its salespeople forever.
That decision could not possibly meet the fault standard, nor could some strained
substitute, like a failure by the CEO to decide at some point to institute a more onerous
system of controls on how traders across the massive bank mark their books.
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The two central problems here are not specific to the UK statute’s approach or to the
banking industry. The first problem is the application of the risk inquiry involved in
criminal recklessness and negligence to contexts in which our corporate-capitalist
economic and social order has placed a high value on the benefits of the relevant activity.
Corporate crime is not Russian roulette, or drag racing, or drunk driving, or angry fights
inside homes or outside bars. It is embedded in economic activities—making food and
medicine, manufacturing cars, extracting energy resources, providing credit and
investment opportunities—that are both highly valued and necessarily entail risks,
financial and physical.
The problem of risk specification is not entirely hopeless. To return to our example
cases, one can see a path to criminal recklessness findings if Albert had been told, the day
before his golfing and scotch hiatus, that the equipment for handling compound X was
wearing out and at peril of immediate failure; if Brad’s bank had a series of cases in
which his bonus compensation system led directly to traders fraudulently mismarking
their books and Brad nonetheless pressed ahead with the same compensation system; or if
Clara had been told that her “rule of fifteen” could only be satisfied by using a fuel tank
that might not be safe and she said to build the car anyway.
These are quite likely reckless CEOs. But, with additional facts like these tying them
down to the harm, they also begin to look more like those who have been convicted in the
smaller company cases—the peanut CEO who said “ship it,” the coal CEO who
micromanaged the handling of safety processes, and the egg company bosses whose
facilities were infested with contaminants.
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The BPs, GMs, and Wells Fargos—and their many analogues of recent years—lack
this sort of evidence with respect to top managers. Recklessness in such cases can be
argued only in an overbroad way: that, by virtue of the CEO’s position and the industry
in which she was employed, she was necessarily aware of the risks of what can go wrong
in her business; if things went wrong, it was because she “disregarded” those risks by not
doing more to prevent what resulted. Such an argument does not hold up. It would
equate recklessness with any decision to spend less than all of the firm’s available assets
on prevention of law violations.
The second problem is that, unlike the paradigm case of a reckless or negligent
violent crime outside the business context, corporate crimes occur within large firms that
are designed to divide and delegate tasks so that very large projects remain humanly
possible and can be accomplished reasonably efficiently. When we couple the necessity
of general risk-taking in a firm with the separation of management from any individual
risky act, it becomes especially difficult to construct an account of criminal-level fault for
a specific instance of harmful behavior.
Take, for example, the explosion on BP’s Deep Horizon rig. It appears that BP
management pushed more aggressive drilling in deeper locations, perhaps on an
insufficiently deliberate schedule. At some level of factual, even if not legal, causation,
there is a relationship between that management agenda and what happened on the well.
But the well exploded only because a small group of engineers on the rig failed to
respond correctly to clear warning signs that should have led them to call urgently for
help from shore—reckless or negligent conduct that BP’s global management had no
awareness of or participation in.
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It is fair to say that those who manage a company such a BP have undertaken a duty
not to egregiously pollute the oceans. We need not specify for present purposes the
various potential sources of that duty in contract law, corporate law, environmental
regulation, and tort law. Suffice it to say that the CEO of a petroleum company has a
duty to do something like “extract oil at a profit without violating the law.”
The complication is not so much in describing the duty as it is in specifying how one
would determine, for purposes of criminal liability, whether there had been compliance
with that duty. The context of the large corporation entails, indeed requires, that the CEO
be able to delegate to others virtually all of the tasks associated with complying with the
duty to extract oil without breaking the law. So the CEO’s duty is more like a duty to
delegate properly than a duty to accomplish the required mandate itself. If the CEO has
delegated properly, then punishing the CEO if things go wrong downstream would
appear to be employing a kind of vicarious liability that is at odds with fundamental
principles of individual fault in criminal law.
This would be so even if we could solve the vexing problem of determining when a
CEO has delegated properly as opposed to deficiently. But such a solution is not likely to
be easily at hand. Has Albert delegated properly if he hires a safety expert so he can
relax on the golf course and then does nothing to follow up (indeed, if the purpose of the
hire was to facilitate golf)? Has Brad delegated properly if he reminds his traders each
time he pays their bonuses that they must not commit fraud? Has Clara delegated
properly is she tells the design team, “Follow the rule of fifteen but keep the car safe.”
These, after all, are the sorts of clichéd management statements and actions that are
typically put forward in defense of a CEO’s conduct after disaster strikes.
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For RCO to operate in a broader way—across more industries and crimes and into
more senior management suites—the doctrine would need to adopt a concept of reckless
or negligent management of large corporations that appears elusive. The idea is too
generalized: risk-taking across the entirety of what a firm does or over the entire set of
law violations that any employee might commit in the course of his or her job, that is,
over the entirety of the compliance function and over everything senior management
delegates.53 Aside from straining principles of individual blameworthiness, such an
approach would require radical change in the conception of who corporate managers are
in the social order—perhaps more like parents than professionals—and would certainly
alter the set of persons willing to assume such positions.54
III. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminalizing the corporation is another way to come at the responsibility gap.
Utilitarian supporters of corporate criminal liability argue that the threat of criminal
sanctions against the firm—coupled with some system that credits self-policing—
encourages directors and officers of corporations to use management policies and
practices to discourage crime by employees, principally by raising the probability of
sanction through effective compliance programs that include reporting violators to the
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government.55 (Utilitarian skeptics wonder why criminal liability, as opposed to civil
sanctions, is necessary to create such incentives; we will not divert into that debate.56)
A convenient fact for utilitarians about corporate criminal liability is that it cannot
lead to individual punishment of managers. They thus need not address the questions
whether there are negative retributive constraints on punishment in this context and
whether those constraints cancel benefits of the doctrine. This utilitarian orientation,
however, which dominates analysis of corporate criminal liability, causes many to miss
something important.
Corporate criminal liability certainly does not involve genuine retribution against
managers. They can suffer no legal punishment from its imposition. But that does not
mean that imposition of liability on the corporation cannot entail some blame of the
firm’s managers. Indeed, pick up a newspaper. It is routine to fault management for
allowing or failing to prevent the sort of serious legal transgressions involved in cases
like BP, GM, JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, Volkswagen, and many others we have not had
space to discuss. Managers commonly lose their jobs over such scandals. The Justice
Department, in its settlement agreements with companies in such criminal cases, typically
goes out of its way to detail the failures of management and compliance implicated in the
particular instance of illegality.57 No wonder then that corporate managers, whenever
they get a chance, express vocal complaints and fears about the potential “death knell”
represented by the imposition of criminal liability on their firms.
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Corporate criminal liability thus has a blaming function—one that is connected to a
social practice of blaming companies and their managers when disaster strikes.58 We
speak comfortably and commonly about what Exxon or Pfizer or Bank of America or
Walmart or Penn State or the Catholic church did. We are not fundamentally misguided
about the metaphysics of the corporation. We understand that people act in concert and
function in particular ways when they behave together within large institutions—
especially the people at the top. What we mean when we say “the corporation did it” is
that “those people who run that place did it” and, often though not always, “they did it
because that’s the way people in that place tended to act.” (A common but not very
illuminating term for what we are referring to when we talk this way is “corporate
culture.”)
It makes sense, then, that corporate blame would involve management blame and that
some of the blaming function of corporate criminal liability would “rub off” on
managers. No bank CEO wants to get caught committing a large fraud. But, short of
that, his biggest concern might well be the bank getting caught for a large fraud—an
event that is likely to result in him losing his job, lowering his future employment
prospects, suffering some public humiliation, and (if he is at all decent) dealing with a
serious blow to his self-esteem.
Still, I do not think that any of this really has the potential to close up the
responsibility gap.59 It is not nothing. But it is also not law and therefore not punishment,
at least not in the sense that criminal law theory defines punishment. No sanctions are
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imposed on managers, no matter how factually, if not legally, responsible they may be for
the corporate crime. The lack of individual sanction is conceded by the utilitarians to be
a problem because many managers may have too much appetite for risk, willing to take
greater chances with the firm’s survival than is in the shareholder’s interest.60 In the end
and after all, even the manager who presides over the worst sort of catastrophe, the one
that leaves many deaths behind, walks away from the imposition of corporate criminal
liability personally unmolested by police, prosecutors, or courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
To review, the large modern corporation produces, among other things, a particular
kind of wrongdoing in which rank-and-file agents of the firm, individually or
collectively, engage in wrongful or harmful acts as a result of firm-wide conditions that
are created, or at least cultivated, by senior management. Particularly if one allows for a
degree of harm-based retributivism—a stance consistent with many aspects of positive
American criminal law—those senior managers bear serious moral responsibility for the
fraud, deaths, cheating of regulatory regimes, or other wrongs involved in such cases.
That responsibility is, in a way, only aggravated by the distance between management
and the relevant actions: their richly compensated position as operators of the powerful
device of the large firm makes them particularly salient objects of blame. Wrongdoing
committed at the hands of workers lies at the feet of management.
Core doctrines of criminal law have nothing to offer those who would seek to convert
this account of moral responsibility into a case for criminal punishment. Indeed those
doctrines, and their animating principles, prohibit liability for corporate managers in the
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paradigm case of no action, no mental state, and high responsibility. Thus we have the
responsibility gap.
The inability of RCO, and especially expanded conceptions of RCO, to make a
persuasive case for closing the responsibility gap tells us something about that gap.
Criminal law is a poor tool for managing the institution of the large modern business
firm. (Criminal law may be a poor tool for managing institutions generally, but that is a
broader discussion.) This is true whether we take criminal law as we find it, in which
case doctrines for closing the gap simply are not there.

Or whether we discuss

“reforming” criminal law to include new doctrines for closing the gap, which then do not
fare well under the justificatory structure of the criminal law.
The problem is the firm. It is the scale of the large corporation, the necessity of
delegation and division of responsibility to the process of “team production,” and even
the founding principle of limited liability (and thus limited personal responsibility) that
are both structural to the firm and that guarantee inevitable separation between action and
responsibility. Criminal law, which paramount among all bodies of law is structured
around the individual, cannot be plausibly molded around the firm—at least not when the
prime objective is responsibility ascription and punishment rather than the production of
incentives to alter behavior. Whether the law targets senior managers or the firm itself, it
is engaged in a futile quest to humanize and individualize something that is an institution
and a system. The mismatch is plain and unavoidable.
A backward-looking orientation thus seems unpromising for responding to the
repeating problem of wrongdoing within the corporation. Rather than trying to close the
responsibility gap ex post through punishment, we might think more deeply about how to
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change the structure of responsibility ex ante—about how to get people to exercise
responsibility rather than about how to impose it upon them.
This leads to a subject quite beyond the topic of this symposium, of course. So let us
conclude by naming those areas of inquiry that might be more promising than a program
for expanding criminal liability along the lines of RCO.
Responsibility is a matter, at least, of both capacity and commitment. Increasing
capacity, I believe, means ensuring that the scale and complexity of the business firm do
not extend beyond the ability of one or a few humans to handle them. Perhaps, then, if
we wish to reduce the incidence of large-scale corporate malfeasance, we need a
rethinking of the basic structure of corporate markets, along the lines of the movement at
the turn of the twentieth century that produced antitrust law and related forms of
regulation.
Commitment can be promoted in a number of ways. Certainly more effective and
directed regulation of industries that involve routine and serious risks is likely to focus
management attention on preventing the worst of problems. Maybe what is needed,
depending on the industry of course, is not so much more regulation as better
enforcement of regulation. The routine and predictable visit of the inspector might be a
better mechanism for heightening management attention than the very occasional, and
sometimes overly discounted, prospect of the prosecutor’s arrival.

Even before the

involvement of inspectors, regulatory regimes could be enhanced to require more
documentation of senior management involvement in review of facts and approval of
decisions—a method, if not to deter wrongdoing in the first instance, perhaps to
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transform some of the cases of management detachment from the wrongdoing into cases
of more direct, provable management involvement.
Corporate governance is also a subject that our recent experiences with the large
modern firm suggest might benefit from some deeper rethinking. There is an emerging
literature about executive compensation as a matter that needs redesign and that might be
a promising tool for enhancing the commitment of managers to controlling the most
potentially damaging kinds of risk.61 Much of the recent literature about the basic rules
of the corporate road—the terms of the corporate charter, the relationship between the
firm and the state, the legal duties and liabilities of corporate officers and directors—is
engaged in an exercise of tinkering to optimize existing regimes.62
Those regimes, which remain oddly tethered to state law in just a few leading
“markets for incorporation,” and the professional discussions about them, appear
increasingly detached from the experience of the contemporary citizen with the large
American corporation and its presence on the ground of daily life. Among institutions of
this age, the corporation has been far from under-theorized. But perhaps that body of
theory has been too successful over time and now interferes with our ability to see where
it needs a more basic rethinking. Corporate crime, on this view, is not nearly so much an
interesting subculture within the sociology and law of crime—at it tends to be treated in
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this exciting and still relatively new field. Much more so, it is a symptom of something
gone wrong with the idea of the corporation itself.

